I. INTRODUCTION 17
Although the sentencing disparities between black and white drug punishment' is thus distinct from 'overpunishment', which I will use 81 7 See, for example, Lippert-Rasmussen, 'Punishment and Discrimination'. 8 For our purposes, total punishment is the product of two factors, the number of people punished and the severity of their punishment. 9 Of course, it must be a salient group; see Lippert-Rasmussen, 'Punishment and Discrimination', p. 170. A salient group is one that structures social interactions across a variety of contexts, e.g. women, LGBTQ, deaf -rather than Camry owners, people born on the 4 July, and so on.
to refer to punishments the severity of which exceeds a malefactor's 82 desert. My article is concerned not with differential punishment 83 simpliciter, but with the differential punishment constituted by the 84 more frequent punishment of marginalized social group G for a given 85 crime c, and that is how the notion should be understood throughout. 86 Establishing the fact of differential punishment is somewhat 87 difficult, given the notorious difficulty of assembling an accurate 88 picture of crime rates. To track changes in crime rates over time and 89 differences among jurisdictions, social scientists usually work with 90 arrest rates. But this shortcut sheds little light on the number of Researchers have amassed better data for drug crimes. 14 Owen McLeod correctly observes that it is hard to get a handle on exactly what it means for a fact to be 'about' a person ('On the Comparative Element of Justice'). But this difficulty need not detain us any more than it has detained anyone else in the last forty-odd years.
15 Some facts about other people are irrelevant to P's desert. For example, the fact that an assistant professor's friends desperately want her to be tenured has no bearing on whether she deserves tenure. 16 One can be a comparativist or non-comparativist about either DB or T, where the disjunction is inclusive. So we have the following set of views: (4) is self-explanatory; it represents orthodox non-comparativism. There is a slight but noticeable difference between (2) and (3). Imagine four friends help you move on a sweltering August day, and you want to reward them with beer. While each friend has worked hard enough to deserve four beers, you have only two six-packs in your refrigerator, and the stores are closed. A proponent of (2) will say that this creates an unavoidable injustice, given the noncomparative nature of desert bases. No matter how you divide the beers, someone will get less than their DB requires, even though an equal distribution is just qua distribution. By contrast, advocates of (3) can say that so long as everyone receives three beers, everyone gets the treatment they deserve, and justice prevails. It is important to note that the comparative egalitarianism discussed earlier is a version of (2), in so far as it asserts a non-comparative conception of desert bases.
The difference between (1) and (3) can be seen in the grading example. Those favouring (1) and (3) would both grade on a curve. But those favouring (3) would not raise Q's grade to match P's, while friends of (1) would. 17 Initially, the contrast between comparative and non-comparative justice was invoked in debates about the role of desert in distributive justice. In this literature, retributive justice is often held up as a paradigm case of noncomparative justice, and retributive and distributive justice are said to be asymmetrical. See comparatively deserve, and it may be disrespectful. These two 342 29 Since my goal is to convince retributivists that differential punishment is a problem, and a problem of a different sort than is sometimes imagined, I make use of some relatively conservative presuppositions. I assume that punishment is legitimate, and that retributivism offers a reasonably satisfactory general justification of punishment. These are contestable assumptions, of course, and adopting them risks obscuring the extent to which the administration of the American criminal justice system is a system of racialized social control. However, they are required by my dialectical aims. Furthermore, I find it interesting to see how differential punishment violates retributive norms, even if retributive institutions might be unjust in their application. 30 (Boston, 2010) . Overall, the types of crimes poor people commit are more likely to be punished with incarceration than those committed by the rich. And blacks tend to be less well-off than whites. But class alone cannot explain drug sentencing disparities; there are almost twice as many whites as blacks living under the poverty line. 69 'A Living Death'. 70 Although this is a bit of armchair philosophizing, I would venture that noncomparative injustice flows from the fact that implicit stereotypes and attitudes are not practically inert and therefore influence how black Americans are arrested, charged and sentenced: the imagined gun generated by weapon bias turns a misdemeanour assault into felony aggravated assault; and the improperly high ascription of culpability renders black children more liable to be tried as adults. In both cases, black offenders are punished disproportionately to their non-comparative desert. 71 80 This admission highlights, rather than diminishes, the significance of the argument on offer, which establishes the responsiveness of retributivism to racial oppression, and steers clear of controversies regarding the priority of distributive or retributive justice. 81 Michael Cholbi develops an interesting argument along these lines regarding disparities in capital sentencing ('Race, Capital Punishment, and the Cost of Murder').
82 By my lights, when a white offender is sentenced too leniently, there is a comparative and non-comparative injustice, but the offender is not wronged. But those who subscribe to the view that offenders have a right to be punished will maintain that such offenders are retributively wronged, because they do not receive the punishment they deserve. A well-known proponent of this view is Herbert Morris, 'Persons and Punishment ' 84 Hurka asserts that comparative injustice should be ameliorated by levelling down ('Desert: Individualistic and Holistic', pp. 54-6), but his argument for this view is not terribly persuasive.
There is a more general problem here. The comparative egalitarian principle can demand treating P too harshly just because Q has been treated too harshly, heaping wrong on top of wrong. Some egalitarians try to get around this unwelcome conclusion by grounding the like cases principle on the claim that individuals deserve equal treatment by virtue of their equal moral standing; see, e.g., Carl Knight, 'Describing Equality', Law and Philosophy 29 (2009), pp. 327-65, at 338ff.; William E. O'Brian Jr, 'Equality in Law and Philosophy', Inquiry 53.3 (2010), pp. 257-84, at 261. This more robust view enables egalitarians to deny that legal institutions must replicate disproportionately harsh treatment, but it also squeezes a healthy dose of respectarianism into egalitarianism. It requires egalitarians to endorse the claim that the problem with differential punishment lies in treating an offender as less worthy than he is. The result is a hybrid egalitarianism that inherits the deficiencies of respectarianism. rates. 91 Given the reality of racial oppression, increasing equality by 902 acting on (a specified range of) competing first-order reasons. More specifically, the claim that tempts me is this: when we are uncertain about crime rates, differential punishment provides a first-order reason for equalizing punishment rates, and a second-order reason that prohibits the development of policies based on crime data. That said, I am sympathetic to comparativism regarding desert bases, and so my own view is that the retributive principle in question may be overly restrictive.
91 As I noted above, whites are much more likely to be arrested for driving under the influence. According to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's self-report survey, whites are responsible for 84 per cent of drink-driving trips; offence rates thus seem to closely track arrest rates. See <http://www.nhtsa.gov/About+NHTSA/ Traffic+Techs/current/Racial+And+Ethnic+Differences+In+Drinking+And+Driving+ Attitudes+And+Behaviors>. Whether self-report surveys regarding criminal activity constitute good evidence is not a matter that can be discussed here.
